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ABSTRACT 
This paper is one of a series on the Australian clothing industry, forming 
part of the research project "A Local Division of Production: Techno-
logical Change and Productive Interlinkages in Australian Manufacturing". 
The project examines the effect of technological change and modern 
production philosophies upon the relationship between clients and suppliers 
within industry sectors. As the emphasis on quality becomes a cornerstone 
of entrepreneurial survival and success both process and product innovation 
take on an increasing significance. The project hypothesizes that these 
changes will have far-reaching consequences upon the interaction between 
leading, or 'core' ,firms and their manufacturing suppliers. 
Within the overall context of the project, the purpose of this paper is 
definitional. It is argued that within the clothing industry chain (or filiere) 
large retail chains are 'core' firms promoting technological and managerial 
change among manufacturing suppliers and their suppliers. It is further 
argued that the responses to change from manufacturers take on diverse 
forms according to size and market position. While manufacturers have 
responded 'flexibly' to changing conditions, the diverse forms of flexi-
blility introduced by different sectors of the market are more characteristic 
of 'neo-Fordism' , and evidence of an emerging 'post-Fordist' consciousness 
among management remains limited. 
The paper begins with a brief history of the Australian clothing industry 
over the past two decades.focusing upon the changing policy environment. 
This leads to a description of the Federal Government's Textile, Clothing 
and Footwear Plan, and an assessment of the problems manufacturers face 
in adjusting to the new conditions. It is then argued that an analysis of the 
'industry chain' must take into account the role performed by core retailers 
in altering manufacturing practices. Two areas in particular are examined; 
the growing awareness of quality control, and the introduction of Quick 
Response strategies. The conclusion reached is that the core retail sector has 
performed, and will continue to perform, a catalytic role within the 
Australian clothing manufacturing sector, and that commentators and 
industry analysts must broaden their conceptions of industry chains in order 
to take account of this factor. 
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RETAILING IS MORE THAN SHOPKEEPING: 
Manufacturing Interlinkages and Technological Change in the 
Australian Clothing Industry 1 
INTRODUCTION2 
Alastair Whyte Greig 
Urban Research Program 
This paper is one of a series on the Australian clothing industry, forming 
part of the research project "A Local Division of Production: Techno-
logical Change and Productive Interlinkages in Australian Manufacturing". 
The project examines the effect of technological change and modem 
production philosophies upon the relationship between clients and suppliers 
within industry sectors. As the emphasis on quality becomes a cornerstone 
of entrepreneurial survival and success, both process and product 
innovation take on an increasing significance. The project hypothesizes that 
these changes will have far-reaching consequences upon the interaction 
between leading, or 'core', firms and their manufacturing suppliers. 
Within the overall context of the project the purpose of this paper is 
definitional. It is argued that within the clothing industry chain (or filiere) 
large retail chains are 'core' firms promoting technological and managerial 
change among manufacturing suppliers and their suppliers. It is further 
argued that the responses to change from manufacturers take on diverse 
forms according to size and market position. While manufacturers have 
responded 'flexibly' to changing conditions, the diverse forms of 
flexiblility introduced by different sectors of the market are more 
characteristic of 'neo-Fordism', and evidence of an emerging 'post-Fordist' 
consciousness among management remains limited (Piore & Sabel, 1984; 
Mathews, 1989). 
Paper presented to the Urban Research Unit Seminar Series, R.S.S.S., A.N.U., 28th 
May, 1990. 
2 I would like to express my gratitude to the numerous individuals employed by the 
firms and organisations interviewed in this study. Without their assistance and 
information this paper could not have been written. Through previous agreement the 
individuals and firms remain anonymous. All unacknowledged references and 
quotations reflect the commercial-in-confidence nature of the information supplied. 
The paper begins with a brief history of the Australian clothing industry 
over the past two decades, focusing upon the changing policy environment. 
This leads to a description of the Federal Government's Textile, Clothing 
and Footwear Plan, and an assessment of the problems manufacturers face 
in adjusting to the new conditions. It is then argued that an analysis of the 
'industry chain' must take into account the role performed by core retailers 
in altering manufacturing practices. Two areas in particular are examined; 
the growing awareness of quality control, and the introduction of Quick 
Response strategies. The conclusion reached is that the core retail sector has 
performed, and will continue to perform, a catalytic role within the 
Australian clothing manufacturing sector, and that commentators and 
industry analysts must broaden their conceptions of industry chains in 
order to take account of this factor. 
CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Australian clothing manufacturing is currently undergoing a process of 
restructuring which will radically alter the face of the industry by the tum 
of the century. The responses which are being demanded of clothing 
manufacturer:_s contrast starkly with the industry's performance during the 
post-war period, which was characterised by stable, long production runs, 
technological stagnation, low capital requirements and an unskilled labour 
force. The social and technological forces at the forefront of the current 
changes are :microelectronic-related advances in production techniques, 
trade liberalisation, and work reorganisation and award restructuring. This 
environment did not envelope the industry overnight. It has evolved over a 
period of twenty years , fostered by changing market and technological 
forces, and policy decision-making. 
As the low-wage, newly-industrialising countries of East Asia expanded 
their appa,rel manufacturing base and targetted the developed nations' 
markets during the late-1960's and early-1970's Australian manufacturers 
were forc~d to rely upon the traditionally high tariff barriers for 
protection. However, in July 1973 this rug was swept from underneath the 
local producers' feet when the Whitlam Government abruptly reduced 
tariff barriers across the board by 25%. The fragility of the industry was 
indicated by the outcome; between 1973 and 1975 the share of imports in 
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the local market jumped from 12% to 20% and the industry shed one-third 
of its workforce (Ellam, 1989). 
The government relented some~hat eighteen months later by controlling 
the volume of clothing imports through introducing quota measures (see 
Warhurst, 1982). The decision was justified as a 'temporary' measure, 
giving the industry time and space to adjust to the changing conditions and 
reorganise itself to compete more effectively against imports (Gregory, 
1985). The period between 1973 and 1977 can be labelled one of 'managed 
chaos' as retailers and manufacturers attempted to revise their corporate 
strategies to cope with the influx of imports. In this revision the conflicting 
interests of the two sectors of the industry manifested themselves. It was the 
manufacturers who lost out most by the move and many still remain bitter 
when recalling the extortionate margins some retailers earned through 
their 'bring it in and we'll sell it' policy. During this period Australian 
manufacturers also began experimenting with off-shore production, with 
companies such as Amco moving facilities to the Philippines and Midford to 
Malaysia, in an attempt to compete more effectively with imports through 
lowering their labour costs. 
Between 1977 and 1981 the 'free trade versus protection' pos1t1ons 
hardened and clarified. The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) 
highlighted the costs borne by the community through protectionist 
measures in two major reports released in 1977 and 1980 (Aust. IAC, 1977, 
1980). In response, an 'unholy alliance' between TCF employers' 
associations and unions pointed to the spectre of unemployment which 
would stalk Australia in the event of the implementation of the IAC's 
deregulationist recommendations. The Textile, Clothing and Footwear 
Industries' 1980 booklet, entitled 120,000 Jobs on the Line: Why Australia 
must retain its textile, clothing and footwear industries, is characteristic of 
their protectionist approach at the time (TCF Industries, 1980). The Fraser 
Government, fearing the electoral consequences of implementing the IAC's 
· recommendations, opted for a 'standstill program', prolonging the 
'temporary' quota system with the aim, or rationale, of maintaining current 
levels of productive activity and employment. Throughout this period TCF 
employment stabilised at around 117 ,OOO, or approximately 9.5% of total 
manufacturing employment. However, despite higher levels of protection 
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than other manufacturing sectors, rates of growth in investment remained 
below the industrial average (Gregory, 1985). 
In January 1982 a seven-year plan for the sector was introduced by the 
government, aimed at gradually managing change through progressively 
increasing quota levels and increasing the amount of quota to be made 
available for allocation by tender each year. The plan attempted to open up 
greater opportunities to Australia's trading partners while providing a 
stable environment in which Australian manufacturers could plan for the 
future. The plan attempted to perform a complex balancing act of 
competing interests. As the government acknowledged, while "having 
regard to employment in the (TCF sectors), the program is designed to 
provide an equitable balance between the often conflicting interests of 
Australian consumers, those involved in the industries, importers and 
Australia's trading partners"(Aust. DTR/DIC, 1982:1). Undoubtedly, the 
problems .involved in performing such an elaborate act led many to 
question its desirability at all. The principal, if unintended, effect of the 
plan was the institutionalisation of a bewildering and complicated array of 
measures., ranging from quotas, tariffs, bounties, by-laws, developing 
country preferences, regional measures, payroll tax exemptions etc., which 
become an accepted feature of the economic landscape. The IAC was quick 
to point out the 'irrational' economic behaviour generated through this 
complex web of arrangements: 
AttemDts to fine-tune arrangements to meet each newly perceived 
cris1~ have in sum yielded a set of almost incomprehensible 
interventions. Customs and by-law schedules are replete with 
inco·nsistencies, trivial and impractical distinctions and arcane 
guidelines. Terms and conditions of import are almost impossible for 
the expert administrator, let alone users, to follow. Many have wound 
up as arbitrary and discriminatory to no general good purpose. People 
haVf! had little option but to monitor and strive to influence decisions 
taken by the bureaucracy and by government, so much so that 
virtuosity in manipulating assistance is a high priority for the exercise 
of entrepreneurial talent. What a waste this is. (Aust. IAC, 1986: xiii). 
By the mid-1980's the trade winds were changing as the newly-elected 
Labor Government began signalling its intention of pushing towards 
deregulation in order to meet the challenge of globalisation. Furthermore, 
by this time there was "an increasing awareness of the failure of policies 
4 
based on trade restrictions" to meet their stated aims (Gregory, 1985). It 
was within this environment that the IAC released its 1986 Report on the 
TCF industries, and the report's recommendations formed the basis of the 
TCF Plan, which commenced in March 1989 and will run its course 
through to June 1995. While the Plan is clearly a victory for the IAC over 
the protectionist lobby, it is also representative of the IAC's new agenda of 
attempting to avoid "the creation of special environments for particular 
industries"-the selective approach-and more towards attempting to 
( 
.. remove 'overall' impediments to industry competitiveness;,_the general 
approach (Mauldon, 1988). 
The principal features of the six-year plan are the gradual dismantling of 
the quota system and the reduction of tariff barriers by 1995. Out-of-quota 
penalty rates will be phased down in six roughly equal stages to zero, while 
the tariff net will be gradually hauled in to the end point of 55% for 
clothing and 45% for footwear by 1995 (see Button, 1987). 
To compensate for the increased import pressure which the sector will face 
as the Plan unfolds a number of positive incentives have been put in place 
under the Industries Development Scheme. These include a Textiles 
Industry Modernisation Scheme (aimed at adding value to raw and semi-
processed materials), an Incentives for International Competitiveness 
Scheme, a Management and Business Skills Scheme, and an Industries 
Infrastructure Program, all aimed at encouraging Australian TCF 
companies to become more efficient and internationally competitive. 
Furthermore, a TCF Unit has been established within Austrade in order to 
assist companies in exploiting overseas market opportunities (through the 
Export Development Program). Both the 1986 IAC Report and the TCF 
Plan acknowledge that some "TCF workers may lose their jobs as a result 
of restructuring" and, to compensate, a Labour Adjustment Program has 
been created through the Department of Employment, Education and 
Training (DEET) and the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) 
network. This program can arrange retraining courses, wage subsidies and 
relocation assistance to workers adversely affected by the 'revitalisation' of 
the industries (see TCFDA, n.d.). Should the Plan "go horribly wrong" 
(defined as a production decline of 20% for the clothing industry) 
provisions have been made for a 'safety net' which could freeze the Plan 
and force a fundamental review of the sector. 
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This profusion of programs, schemes and strategies is being administered 
by a new umbrella statutory body, the Textiles, Clothing and Footwear 
Development Authority (TCFDA). 
All interested parties appear to have accepted the inevitability of industrial 
restructuring. For the government, it is a logical progression down the path 
of deregulation and reduced government assistance for industry, and it 
follows the prescriptions outlined in the two major reports of the IAC 
during the 1980's. The Clothing and Allied Trades Union (CATU) has 
moved in line with the ACTU's document "Australia Reconstructed" and 
has actively supported the TCF Plan (Ellam, 1990). Within its framework 
they are working to ensure that its implementation corresponds with award 
restructuring, multi-skilling and higher wages. Anna Booth, CATU's 
secretary, believes that the industry is at the crossroads of oblivion or 
"regeneration. "What we have to ask is: is this industry going to continue as 
the lowest paid industry in Australia, making a bit of everything, always 
desperately seeking protection from low-cost imports? Or is it going to be a 
high-wage industry, possibly a smaller industry, competing on the world 
stage on the basis of quality and fashion?" Referring to her members, she 
oints out that "We've always got the arse-end of protectionism. That is 
why I say categorically that if this industry is not a high wage industry in 
five years time, then it's not worth having" (Bagwell, 1989; Hooper, 1989). 
The employers have also now accepted that the days of high protection are 
numbered and are tailoring their corporate strategies accordingly. They 
acknowledge that the 'gradualism' of the TCF Plan is superior to the 
overnight 25% tariff reduction implemented by the Whitlam government 
in 1973, allowing them time to adjust to the new conditions. Their main 
concern is now ensuring that the government maintains the parameters they 
have set for reconstruction in the face of calls to 'compress' the program 
within a shorter timeframe (see Garnaut, 1989) 
When Keith Purcell, the Executive Director of the Textile, Clothing and 
Footwear Council of Australia (TCFCA), told an industry briefing in 
Sydney on May 3, 1990 that he "can't remember a more challenging period 
facing the TCF sector" many company spokespersons in the audience 
clearly perce,ived the word 'challenging' as a euphemism for 'impossible'. 
Many pointed to a series of unique features in the Australian environment, 
ranging from geographical location to the current economic climate, which 
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compound the problems local manufacturers are having to face while 
adjusting to the TCP Plan. Firstly, Australia is now unique among all other 
developed countries in its degree of deregulation, since the others still 
employ some form of volume restrictions, or quotas, on apparel imports 
from developing;nations. The Australian govemmenCs decision is clearly 
pro-active' in terms of international trade policy. Secondly, the clothing 
producers of.other OECD countries have much larger •markets to serve 
than Australia, posmg the problem of economies of scale. Thirdly, these 
nations are much closer to the recognised centres of leading-edge 
technology than Australia, creating major import headaches with respect to 
investments in plant and equipment. (The key annual apparel machinery 
trade .fairs are those of Cologne in West Germany and the Bobbin Show in 
Georgia, U.S.A.) Fourthly, the Plan has been implemented on top of some 
of the toughest market conditions in the past two decades . . Manufacturers · 
problems have been accentuated by the general downturn in consumer 
demand and high interest rates, as the government uses its fiscal muscle in 
an attempt to ,curb spending. Indicators of its success can be seen in the 
depressed retail sales of large companies such as Coles Myer over 1989-
1990 (Australian , 1990), and the effect is being past back through the 
industry chain to the clothing producers, who finished 1989 with stocks 7% 
higher than the previous year. Thus, manufacturers are concerned that 
while the international playing field remains uneven, they are being forced 
to play by rules unsuited to the terrain. 
While all players predict that the industrywill contract in terms of number 
of establishments and employment other developments surrounding the 
industry suggest that the 'sunset' of Australian clothing manufacturing is 
far from an inevitable process. Given appropriate public policies and an 
environme-nt -of cooperation between companies in the industrial chain 
(from raw material and component suppliers through. to retailers) the 
1990' s could witness the 'dematuration' or regeneration of the industry. 
B~ the end of the , 198(Ys three developments had converged with the 
government's state tention to liberalise trade and called into question the 
comparative advantage of low-wage nations in apparel manufacturing. The 
first condition is the changing market conditions within developed nations, 
where · consumers and retailers are demanding greater variety, more 
· innovative design and higher· quality products .. The satisfaction of this 
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{ demand has forced manufacturers to consider more flexible manufacturing 
systems to react more quickly to a more diversified and segmented market 
(see AAMA, 1988). This transformation has led many commentators to 
suggest that industry is moving away from 'Fordist' techniques of mass 
production serving a mass consumption market to one of post-Fordism, 
using more dedicated machinery, producing shorter batch runs and 
adopting techniques offering greater flexibility at the firm level (Mathews, 
1989). Secondly, technological advances during the decade moved towards 
solving many of the problems associated with Quick Response (QR) and 
Just-In-Time (JIT) production strategies. The application of micro-
elecronic-related products and robotics to the clothing industry has been 
notoriously difficult due to the limp nature of the materials handled, which 
are unlike steel, wood and plastics. The 'smartest' computers find it 
difficult to recognise and accurately transform fabrics which change their 
shape when gripped. Over the past decade, however, numerous 
microelectronic-related products have been harnessed to the production 
process within the clothing industry to reduce the timespan between 
product initiation and final delivery of finished goods (see Rush & Soete, 
1984). These advances in automation have radically transformed the stages 
of concept initiation and pre-assembly (although the assembly stage remains 
highly labour-intensive and dominated by the traditional sewing machine). 
Thirdly, the application of new managerial strategies, such as JIT, QR, 
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Value-Added Management (VAM) 
have meant that shorter production runs are now more cost effective. 
Furthermore, these techniques have reduced many non-labour and non-
value-adding costs (such as materials handling) and increased overall 
efficiencies. The implementation of these strategies also poses the question 
of whether they demand a more highly skilled workforce and challenge the 
traditional image of clothing manufacturing as a 'sweatshop' industry 
(AAMA, 1988; Windsor, 1989) 
In the light of th~ changing environment, hypotheses have been generated 
suggesting that thC CO!,llparative advantages afforded to low-wage nations 
may become less impo~t as Quick Response, flexible maufacturing 
systems, higher quality, innovation, brand strength, and niche marketing 
become the critical success fadors in leading-edge clothing manufacturing 
(Aust. DITAC, 1985; Pearson, 1986; OECD, 1988; Hoffman & Rush, 
1988, Parker, 1989a). Moreover, the 'comparative advantage' of the low-
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wage countries is further offset by the problems of distance in a retail 
market dictated by increasingly shorter turnaround times and stockholding 
reductions. The logic of JIT techniques demands delivery reliability 
coupled with smaller, more frequent, orders, and local producers have a 
distinct natural advantage in this field (Sloan, 1985; Parker, 1989b ). 
Thus, as the Australian clothing industry enters the 1990's a host of factors 
are forcing companies to rethink traditional methods of garment 
manufacturing. Furthermore, many of these factors are centrifugal, some 
exposing the industry to dangers and challenges, while others open 
possibilities and opportunities. The combined nature of these forces 
compound the difficulties of predicting the form the industry will assume 
by the tum of the century. This paper will demonstrate that there is another 
crucial factor, often ignored, which must be taken into consideration before 
any predictions are made, namely the role of the retail sector. 
METHODOLOGY 
It is within this evolving economic, technological and organisational 
context that clothing manufacturing was identified as one of three case 
studies for the research study "A Local Division of Production: 
Technological Change and Productive Interlinkages in Australian 
Manufacturing". The other sectors chosen were the automotive and 
electronics industries. In order to 'map' the structure of Australian clothing 
manufacturing, and identify the 'core' firms driving technological change 
and innovative behaviour, preliminary interviews were conducted with a 
wide range of groups involved with the industry. Although these interviews 
were unstructured their aim was to develop a multi-dimensional picture of 
the clothing industry, to understand the variables affecting change within 
the sector, and to identify problems facing diverse interests in adapting to 
industry restructuring. Government-related interviews were conducted 
with a former IAC commissioner involved in the IAC TCF reports of the 
1980's, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (Victoria) and 
the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Development Authority. Interviews 
then proceeded with organisations closer to the 'coalface', including the 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Council of Australia (the main clothing 
employers' association), the Clothing and Footwear Institute (CFI) and the 
Clothing and Allied Trades' Union. Discussions were also held with 
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relevant trade magazines, T AFE fashion and design coordinators, apparel 
machinery suppliers and other researchers conducting studies into the 
industry. 
The preliminary findings from these interviews suggested that any study of 
clothing manufacturing had to extend beyond the realm of manufacturing 
proper and take into account the crucial role large retailers perform in the 
process of product and process innovation. Indeed, there appeared to be a 
growing degree of cross-fertilisation of functions between retailers and 
large manufacturers. Thus, within the context of the overall study, the core 
firms within the clothing industry appeared to differ in nature from those 
identified in the automotive and electronic sectors. (In the automotive 
industry core firms were the five major car assemblers, and in the 
electronics industry they were usually giant multinational corporations 
assembling mainly overseas-produced components into electronic-related 
products). It was decided to define the large retailers as core firms while 
manufacturers were defined as suppliers. Within the manufacturing sphere 
proper, a distinction was made between the large, or 'principal', 
manufacturers and their 'makers up' (sub-contractors to whom the 
principals hive-off or farm out aspects of the production process, such as 
sewing operations). Thus, a three-tier relationship was bracketed off within 
the clothing filiere as the central focus of the study incorporating large 
retailers, principal manufacturers and makers up. In this sense the clothing 
industry more closely resembles the food-processing industry than the 
automotive or electronics industry. 
Justification for this methodology also came from ex1stmg research 
literature in the UK and elsewhere, which highlighted the important role of 
retailers in encouraging innovation and quality improvement among their 
manufacturing suppliers (Tse, 1985; Senker, 1988; Gibbs, 1988). 
Interviews were then conducted with a number of Australia's largest 
clothing retail chains in order to examine areas such as their marketing 
techniques, their purchasing policies, their perception of their 
manufacturing suppliers and their involvement in the production process, 
from design through to packaging. Once data from these firms was 
collected and analysed a structured interview schedule was administered to 
eighteen principal clothing manufacturers. These were either individual 
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private companies, individual public listed companies, or divisions within 
larger corporate networks. All had been listed in 1989 within the top ten 
performers with respect to turnover. All interviews were conducted in 
New South Wales or Victoria at the factory level or at corporate 
headquarters with senior production staff. Areas covered included 
company structure and operations, customer profiles, product innovation, 
production details, technology used in the enterprise, work organisation, 
company restructuring, relations with suppliers and subcontractors and 
perceptions on the future of the industry. Finally, similar questionnaires 
were administered to a number of makers-up (CMT's) and also to a number 
of small-to-medium sized manufacturers involved in the fashion industry. 
The analysis below focuses upon the interviews conducted with the core 
retailers. The reasons for this emphasis are twofold: firstly, to justify the 
definition of retailers as 'core' firms within the overall context of the 
'Local Division of Production' project; and secondly, to provide evidence 
that the retail sector has performed a crucial role in the transformation of 
manufacturing techniques and managerial practices within the industry. A 
more detailed analysis of the diversity of manufacturing responses to 
change will follow this paper, entitled 'Rhetoric and Reality in the Clothing 
Industry: The Case of Post-Fordism'. 
THE CHANGING FACE OF RETAILING 
If Australian clothing manufacturers are to survive during the 1990's they 
must respond positively to the changing trade environment created by the 
removal of the quota system and the reduction of tariff barriers. These 
conditions will encourage an influx of garments from the low wage, newly 
industri'alised countries. Survival therefore depends on convincing the 
Australian consumer that the Australian-made product represents equal or 
better value than their imported counterparts in terms of quality, price and 
reliability. Yet, it is the retailer who interprets the wants and desires of the 
consumer. A more cooperative environment between retailers and local 
manufacturers than the conflict evident in the 1970's must therefore form 
the cornerstone of the local industry's survival and regeneration. 
In the existing literature on industry, there is a tendency to view retailers as 
merely passive recipients of products from manufacturers and wholesalers 
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and to treat them as simply 'shopkeepers'. As Bliss has noted "economic 
theory has had extraordinarily little to say about the retail enterprise. The 
theory of production and pricing has been mainly addressed to the 
manufacturing firm and does not readily translate itself to the case of the 
shop .... To this day the great majority of textbooks on microeconomic 
theory do not treat retailing at all." (Bliss, 1888: 376-7; see also Tucker & 
Yamey, 1973) This productive/non-productive distinction often employed 
in political economy has been questioned by Jacqueline Senker in her study 
of the role performed by supermarkets in the British food processing 
industry. Her conclusions "demand that traditional economic theories about 
retailing be revised to take account of retailers' active involvement in 
innovation" (Senker, 1988: 5). On the other hand, Hoffman and Rush's 
comprehensive analysis of the effect of microelectronic-related innovations 
(MRl's) upon the clothing industry devotes barely a page to retailing, 
despite acknowledging the importance of the structure of retailing for 
manufacturing (Hoffman & Rush, 1988). Currently, little attention is 
placed upon the way in which the evolving structure of retailing and the 
changing needs and strategies of retailers affect the manufacturing sector. 
One of the most celebrated cases of cooperation between retailers and 
manufacturers involves the British retailer Marks and Spencer. The 
company's involvement in manufacturing began in the late-1920's when 
Simon Marks persuaded the hosiery company Messrs Corah of Leicester to 
manufacture stockings under Marks and Spencer's own label, St Michael 
(Tse, 1985). The company has been called a · 'manufacturer without 
factories' cooperating with manufacturers who are 'retailers without 
stores' (Lord Sieff, 1978). Of the company's six basic principles, two relate 
directly to their relations with suppliers: firstly , "to encourage our 
suppliers to use the most modem and efficient techniques of production, 
dictated by the latest discoveries in science and technology"; and secondly, 
"with the co-operation of these suppliers, to enforce the highest standards 
of quality control". The company designs garments, tests and develops 
fabrics, monitors their suppliers' production, suggests new production 
techniques aimed at better quality and greater efficiency, markets the 
product under their own St Michael brandname, then receives feedback 
from consumers through their retail outlets. Over 350 technologists are 
employed with the charter to: "1) provide a technical link with our 
manufacturers with whom they talk a common language; 2) advise and 
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educate our own management in technical matters; 3) provide high standard 
specifications for our own products; 4) follow through the control of 
quality; 5) search for the most promising new lines of development and co-
operate with our manufacturers in the formative period; 6) act as catalysts 
by keeping our manufacturers informed of new machinery or processes 
which would improve production and quality" (Salisse, n.d.). These 
activities clearly transcend the traditionally conceived parameters of 
retailing. The company has over 800 suppliers, 50 of whom it has been 
dealing with for at least 40 years, and purchases approximately 20% of 
Britain's clothing production. Although on average Marks and Spencer 
accounts for between 30-50% of its customers' turnover, a number of the 
largest suppliers are almost totally 'dedicated' to the production of the St 
Michael brand. Despite the closeness of their relationship with these 
manufacturing suppliers the company does not have any financial stake in 
them (Tse, 1985). 
The Marks and Spencer model has been hailed by many as an organisational 
panacea for problems as diverse as 'late development' in developing nations 
to the streamlining of the British Civil Service and British Telecom (see 
Howells, 1981; Tse, 1985). Within the Australian clothing industry the 
model has been suggested by some spokesmen as a necessary direction for 
the industry's survival. For example, writing in the October 1988 issue of 
the CFI journal SewTrade , John Beckenham noted that Australian retailers 
"are already demanding quality improvements from local makers-and this 
is likely to become the norm. In United Kingdom the great Marks and 
Spencer chain have done much to improve British manufacturing overall. 
And this could and should be the shape of things to come in Australia" 
(Beckenham, 1988). 
There are others, however, who question the benefits which accrue to 
manufacturers through such a close marriage with their giant retailing 
clients. Firstly, dependence on a single customer leaves manufacturers 
vulnerable if they are unable to repond to a shift in their core customer's 
marketing strategy. Long-term contracts are the rare exception rather than 
the rule within the garment retailing sector. Retailers always reserve the 
right not to purchase their suppliers' products. Secondly, many consider the 
pivotal role of Marks and Spencer within the production process as a recipe 
for ossification rather than innovation within the manufacturing sector by 
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discouraging an in-house culture of quality awareness. Thirdly, the 
dominant position of the company has led to the criticism that it is able to 
squeeze and control the profit margin of its suppliers, adversely affecting 
technical innovation, stunting growth and discouraging investment. These 
criticisms are often heard during periods of retailing downturns or price 
wars among the giant retailing chains. Fourthly, while Marks and Spencer 
argue that they have no interest whatsoever in vertical integration and 
continue to have no financial stake in the manufacturing sector, this has led 
to claims that their position allows them to assert 'power without financial 
responsibility' (see Plant, 1981; Rainnie, 1984; Gibbs, 1988). 
The remainder of this paper will examine the evolving relationship between 
retailers and manufacturers within the Australian context and examine the 
following questions: to what extent has the evolving structure of Australian 
retailing affected manufacturers? To what extent have retailers followed 
the Marks and Spencer model of fostering closer linkages with the 
manufacturing sector? Finally, the paper will briefly examine how 
manufacturers have responded to retailers' evolving demands. 
AUSTRALIA'S RETAILING ENVIRONMENT 
Australia's retailing environment has undergone significant change over 
the past two decades. Firstly, the retailing sector has witnessed a process of 
mergers and take-overs resulting in a far more oligopolistic structure than 
previously. Up until the mid-1970's the market was dominated by a host of 
small-to-medium sized independent department stores. While there still 
remained, by the end of the 1980's, some 400 department stores, 450 
general stores and 13,200 boutiques and specialty stores, a small number of 
large conglomerates dominated the market. The Coles Myer group, as a 
result of the merger of the two companies in 1985, is now the largest 
retailer in the southern hemisphere and the 12th largest retail chain in the 
world. It is also the largest private employer in Australasia with a total staff 
of 166,000 (Coles Myer, 1989). This represents enormous strength when 
the relatively small market it serves is taken into consideration. The second 
principal retail conglomerate is the Adsteam group, which acquired 93% of 
the Industrial Equity group in 1989. This brought together David Jones and 
the Big-W chain, plus a number of smaller retailers. However, the potential 
synergies are not as great within this group as within the larger Coles Myer 
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group. whose divisions often share purchasing offices and quality control 
departments. Manufacturers in this environment have lost the luxury of 
being abJe to move orders from one department chain to another. offering 
the same product. 1be loss of a major customer. or even a major order. can 
often spell commercial disaster for a manufacturer (TCFIC, 1984; 
Koostantanidis, 1987; City of Melbourne, 1987). It also enables the large 
retailers to dictate stricter terms and negotiate larger discounts from their 
suppliers. 
In response0 more and more manufacturers (especially small-to-medium 
sized companies in the fashion end of the market) have attempted to 
guarantee at least a partial market through establishing their own retail 
outlets. usually in exclusive sectors of major cities. An associated 
development has been the growth of 'concept' stores, or 'stores within a 
store', whereby core department stores sublet floorspace to a manufacturer 
or designer. who employs specially trained sales staff and fills/refills the 
space with its own coordinates and collections. This practice lessens the 
distance between manufacturer and final consumer, while attracting 
customers. who have to walk through other sections of the retail 
establishment. In tum. core retailers, such as David Jones, are attempting to 
promote the image of shopping as an 'entertainment' in order to compete 
with the mass-merchandising discount stores (BRW. 1990a). While more 
department stores are adopting this form of restructuring an ·independent 
consortium is planning to open a specialty department store in Sydney 
catering for fifty suppliers along the lines of Galeries Lafayette and 
Printempts in France and the Diamaru Department Store in Tokyo 
(Ragtrader, 1989). 
Secondly, the process of mergers has created a number of locational 
difficulties for many manufacturers, as the large retailers move towards 
more centralised purchasing policies, in order to avoid duplication of 
buying offices. For example. from the winter of 1990 onwards. the Coles 
Myer group will close its Grace Bros buying office in Sydney and replace it 
with central buying from Myers in Melbourne. Sydney manufacturers who 
previously dealt with Myers will feel the effect less, but for those who dealt 
principally with Grace Bros (Sydney's last big department store group) the 
move will be a disaster if they fail to penetrate Myers• orders book 
(Men.rWear, 1989; Ragtrader, 1990). 
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A third change in clothing .retailing over the past two decades -has: been the 
growth of the discount market .. Coles Myer dominates. between·65.,.70%:'0f 
the discount market·througb·their.K-Mart. and Target · chain stores alone, 
excluding their other volume-purchasing stores such.as .Fosseys and Katies. 
As this paper will later demonstrate; the discounters haveiperfoi:med a cata-
lytic role in-ttansfonning relations .between retailers and manufacturers. · 
'! 
Fourthly, the discounters, and to a lesser extent the department stores, now 
also compete directly with the manufacturers .branded products through 
their own ·ho11$Cbraods. Within- the Target discount chain, for: example; the 
majority of clothing.items are sold under.the store's own ·Target brand, 
while department stores also -market their- •own ,in-houSe,• 'pricewise' 
brands, such as David Jones' St James and Agenda labels. Mass 
manufacturers who · previously occupied ·the . middle of th~ martet ·have 
therefore been forced to-diversify their brand strength .and sharpen their 
marketing strategies in order to .cope with the· .segmentation..-of the ·mat'k4t 
into department. stores and discount stores (PSA, 1987).-.FoF-;eumple; one 
of the reasons for Holep~f's strength over .the past decade ltas been its 
-~uc~s.;. . through product diversification, in tappil\g into the ·discount 
market.with i~ Rio brand, In or-Oer to succeed in this ptice-sensitive end of 
-~'~e~ the cQQlpaIJ.y. W.3;8 pr:epare~ to IJlll. a loss on the ,brand.from its 
in~~.o.-;in l979 .until 1982. Today Rio.i,§ Jl()lepf9Qf!.s ~ largeat seller 
w~t.Ji an annual tumoyer of $120 million at)d .a . .matk,eting ·.budget~f$3.5 
million (Shoebridge, ,1989). . - :... . -'· _ ,,_ . . . 1c· 
! . . i o f ~ :":. i~ I ·-
Fifthly, the large retail chains llave ·also become increasing.ly active in the 
field of direct importing (fCFlC, 1984; Cummings, 1986; PSA; 1987). For 
this reason wholesaling importers have become ail increasingly,. less 
significant feature in the Australian clothing landscape. Importing has 
always -been an important element in the industry arld'- smce the 
establishment of the Tariff Board in 1921 there have been some500 reports 
released re_~ting to importing arrangements in the TCF sectOr (Aust. IAC, 
19&6). In~~tingly, during the 1930's Japan was one, of the ~est 
coUQtries·. ofcorigin of cheap apparel into Australia . . By. 1988 ·33% of 
clothing imports· came from China, '10% from Taiwan and' 8% from Korea 
(TCFCA, 1989). The large Tetailers now 1Jsetheirvolume-buyinj· po\ver to 
purehase imports directly, or thiough overseas· agents., and, arc able to 
16 
absorb the margins traditionally taken by wholesale importers. Coles Myer 
are Australia's largest quota holder, while Big-W are also significant. 
However, some 2,000 establishments are still involved in wholesaling or 
importing of TCF products. Only one of Australia's top ten clothing 
companies, the Danchen Corporation, is principally an importer rather 
than a manufacturer. As the quota system is progressively dismantled 
during the course of the TCF Plan, principal manufacturers, such as the 
Gazal Corporation, have voiced their intention to become more and more 
involved in competing with the retailers in apparel importing in the cheap 
end of the market, in an effort to supplement their ranges and retain their 
market strength (Thomas, 1989). As one Manufacturing Manager stated: 
"We won't sit back and let the retailers take our part of imports". 
Thus, both the changing structure of retailing and the changing trading 
environment have forced changes in Australian clothing manufacturers' 
practices: The manufacturers' spread of customers has been adversely 
affected by the growing concentration of retailing establishments while the 
segmentation of the market into discounting and department chains has 
forced the manufacturers to diversify their range of products. The 
introduction of housebrands by the retailers has also forced the 
manufacturers to become more conscious about the image of their own 
brandnames and targetting a particular niche, and consequently heightened 
the importance of their own marketing strategies. Lastly, the TCF Plan has 
forced many manufacturers to consider expanding their non-
manufacturing activities through competing directly with the retailers in 
the importation of garments. The changes noted by the American Apparel 
Manufacturers' Association in the United States are also beginning to make 
themselves felt within Australia: 
Revolutionary changes in the apparel marketplace have seen large 
retail organisations integrating backwards into manufacturing, 
sourcing their own private label merchandise directly while assuming 
many of the product development roles once performed exclusively by 
manufacturers. At the same time, vendors with strong brands have set 
up their own retail outlets, or taken control over their own space 
within department stores. Such role changes have distorted the 
boundary line between vendors and retailers, while raising the 
premium on more flexible and responsive manufacturing capability (AAMA, 1988: 2). . 
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1l1e remainder of this paper will provide two examples of how Australian 
retail organisations have integrated backwards into manufacturing. These 
are areas where retailers have actively encouraged changes in manu-
facturers' practices. The first area concerns 'quality control' and second 
involves 'quiek reponse'. 1l1ese examples also provide further evidence of 
retailers' core status within the clothingflliere. 
RETAILING AND QUALITY CONTROL 
The discounters have been at the forefront of revolutionising relations 
between retailers and manufacturers through their growing concern (some 
manufacturers would claim obsession) with quality control in the extremely 
competitive high volume, lower end of the market. All the large 
discounters have invested millions of dollars in extremely sophisticated 
quality control laboratories and demand exacting specifications from their 
manufacturing suppliers. Quality control has evolved to become a core 
component of the discounters' purchasing policy and now encroaches on 
many operations traditionally conceived of as lying within the 
manufacturers' sphere of responsibility. 
Until the late-l 960's the boundaries between manufacturing and retailing 
remained conventional: manufacturers designed, produced, assembled and 
packaged while retailers remained shopkeepers. No Australian mass 
retailer had attempted to emulate the Marks and Spencer philosophy, 
developed in the I 930's and l 940's, whereby the retailer functioned as a 
'manufacturer without factories'. 
"Il!ere was a peculiarly local reason why major issues of quality control 
emerged in Australia. It did not simply emerge as a desire to emulate 
successful overseas models. One of the main catalysts for change was the 
retailers' frustration with the anarchy that existed (and still exists) with size 
specifications among Australian clothing manufacturers. There were 
virtually no standards regulating, for example, the dimensions of amens' 
size 12 shirt. This problem reaches its height at the interface between the 
retailer and the final consumer, resulting in customer returns and product 
mark-downs. Unlike European countries, which undertake regular surveys 
of the changing physical shape of their populations, anthropometric studies 
are almost non-existent in Australia. Ironically, there have been exceptional 
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cases where Australian manufacturers have pioneered scientific research 
into the changing shape of the human body. For example, as far back as 
1926 the Berlei Company (now part of the Pacific Brands division of 
Pacific Dunlop) in collaboration with Sydney University conducted a study 
of 6,000 women and revolutionised corset fitting through their 'Berlei 
Figure-Type Indicator' and the 'Berlei Five Figure Type Classification'. 
These indicators became internationally accepted standards for corset 
manufacturing. However, such collaboration between research institutes 
and the industry have been rare exceptions rather than the norm. Even 
today there are no body measurement standards for mens' clothing, while 
the accepted standards for womens' clothing, the AS1344-1975, was based 
upon a 1969 study conducted by the Standards Association using overseas 
information topped up with responses from people who filled in a coupon 
in the Australian Womens' Weekly! Most industry spokespersons acknow-
ledge that these statistically unreliable standards are in need of revision (see 
SewTrade, 1990). 
Given the lack of coordination among Australia's 1,700 clothing manu-
facturers, retailers are constantly calling for a uniform set of standards 
agreed upon by all manufacturers and retailers. In the meantime size 
specifications have become an important part of the function of retailers' 
quality control departments. 
Prompted by the lack of coherence in garment sizes K-Mart established 
quality control in 1968 (the same year they entered the Australian market in 
a joint-venture between Coles and the US company SS Kresge). Around the 
same time Woolworths set up a quality control department, consisting of a 
desk, a telephone, an iron and a domestic washing machine. Frum these 
modest beginnings quality assurance departments grew to assume more and 
more control over the specifications demanded for garment purchasing, 
such as fibre content, country of origin (and other factors of component 
and production traceability), care labelling, flammability, dyefastness, 
shrinkability and variability or replicability. All major discounters now 
rely upon quality control facilities to inform and guide their purchasing 
departments and monitor suppliers' production. 
While retailers will still stress that they are 'shopkeepers' and that "quality 
is none of our business", the central role of such quality control 
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<Jepartments within the retail sector has radically transformed the 
traditional relationship between retailers and manufacturers. While no 
Australian retailer has gone as far as Marks and Spencer in monitoring and 
controlling their manufacturing suppliers, the trend over the past twenty 
years has been in this direction, especially in the high-volume discount end 
of the market. Target is widely considered to be the Marks and Spencer of 
Australia, closely followed by their Coles Myer cousin, K-Mart. At a 
seminar held in mid-1988, jointly sponsored by the Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA) and the National Industry Extension Service (NIES), 
entitled 'Without Quality, What Future?', K-Mart annnounced its intention 
to begin 'quality auditing' their manufacturing suppliers. "The audit would 
measure their competence and their ability to prove reliable suppliers, and 
the information would be provided to buyers to help assess the 
manufacturers quality attitude." Likewise, Target demands that suppliers 
submit themselves to a quality assurance test before they are placed upon 
Target's supplier list (Ragtrader, 1988). Their quality controllers can walk 
into manufacturers' establishments at any time to monitor production 
techniques. 
It is clear that the transfonnation in client-supplier relations over the past 
two decades has been driven principally by the discounters rather than the 
more up-market department stores, such as David Jones and Grace Bros. 
David Jones does not even possess a quality control department, while 
Grace Bros inspections are conducted on receipt of goods using AS1199, a 
statistical method 'Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by 
Attributes'. One means of expressing this distinction between the 
department stores and the discounters is through describing the department 
stores' approach to their suppliers as 'arms length', compared to the 
discounters more 'direct control' approach (Gibbs, 1988). 
The more up-market department stores practise quality control while the 
discounters have moved beyond this stage into the realm of quality 
assurance. Quality control involves the inspection of the finished product at 
the end point of the production process or at the customers' receiving 
stations. The methods used are usually statistical spot-checking. On the 
other hand, quality assurance involves 'building in quality at the source'. 
The method centres upon ensuring that as far up the production chain as 
possible, from suppliers, to suppliers' suppliers, suppliers' sub-contractors 
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and · component and :raw material . suppliers,. . quality· problems · are 
discovered ;and isolated and that any offending garment ot ·component is 
either reworked er ·rejected. Through using this method of building in 
quality at tbe ·source retailers· have. witnessed a dramatic improvement.of 
the quality of• ·goods-on-receipt. For example, Best and Less, which 
undertook a. majOJ::rnstrucbiring of, its• quality :assurance program in 1983, 
·has reducedthe proportion ofrejected gafi!lCiltS'from 25% down.to around 
2%..r.Thi.S!•reduc;tion is eV,en more ·impressive:· since· the .company now 
possesses ·one.of t:bie most · sophisticatedrquality laboratories in the countiy. 
In ·other ,words;;the;:company has raised the quality of its garments. while 
lowering .rejects; :using· more, sophisticated: quality indicators (SewTrade, 
l988),• :. ;.•:'. >c'i : ·· •· , . ·;,-, · • 'l '. · 
·•'•. 
·1 ···.:. 
Quality.assn.ranee, rather. than quality control, is even more important for a 
~t.ailer , .such as Best· .IUld Less, which has resisted the trend towards 
centl.'alised .warebousing .and distribution. ManufactUring suppliers and 
wholeS:alers $end· their orders direct to Best and Less' 80 retail outlets. This 
strategy. requires an enormous amount of trust between the retailer and the 
inanufac.turer :because any quality faults are more likely to be detected by 
~ nnal·C:ODS~r rather than the.•:r:etailer. Under :these conditions, priority 
in quality ~Ul'Bl)CC must.lie· in-educating 'lQld assisting·,Jilallllfactl,irers to be 
IJlOJe qµality .aware .rather than 'policing' goods for quality -as they arrive in 
deliveJY tnJcks a.t the.retailers' gate. 
. i ·. · ·'or 't~ 
1be· pr-ocess; or cycle, involving design; ordering,c.inspeetion, ~ordering 
. or redesigning, is known as ·the: '.quality controlloop': by both discounters 
.and ,depa,unent .stores. lbe_ discounters'. .loops are generally more rigorous, 
invo}vipg .~ inspection. steps . . A typicaHoop. practised · by one of the 
major discounters,is ·descrjbed .below,.iJl order to demonstrate the influence 
which retailers assert over the manufacturing process. There are five main 
,stages: in·' .tbe control loop: sample testing .and rep<>n raising; garment 
inspection .m .production; inspection ·of ·finished goods at 1he distribution 
.. ~ll!;l"e-; - randQm sampling in selected ,stores and· store complaint~feedback; 
analysis of @lllputerised ·sales figures'3Ild final· gross profit pcrfonnances 
: ~ ! . . . 
A .gannenuample:or prototype ,will be delivered· by the lftailufacturer to a 
~tailer'.s quality assurance . department; This prototype will have. been 
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designed by the manufacturer or the retailer will have asked the 
manufacturer to produce it according to their specifications, or some 
combination of the two. The garment then undergoes a process of testing 
for fibre content, size, dyefastness, shrinkage in washing mashines and 
tumble dryers, shading, flammability. etc. From the test a report will be 
raised. There are three types of reportS, based on a 'traffic light system', 
which are sent to the purchasing or buying department for decisions on the 
volume to be produced. A green report signals that the prototype meets the 
retailer's quality specifications and enables the purchaser to 'place orders 
with the manufacturer. A yellow report signals that the prototype requires 
some minor modifications before entering the mass production stage, while 
a pink or red report signals that the garment requires complete reworking 
before being considered by the purchasing department. 
Once the garments are given the green light they are inspected in 
production, and the retailers' quality controllers monitor the production 
methods applied in the factory. The principal quality assurance problem at 
-this second stage of the quality loop is ensuring replicability, or minimising 
variability. Enormous frustration was voiced by Quality Control Managers 
interviewed on this problem. According to one "the main problem .is once 
an excellent prototype is developed they can seldom assure replicability of 
2,000. Why? God knows! If it's done in three, different factorieM1.:e often 
get three different styles!". Apart from the human error inevitable in any 
labour-intensive process such as garment manufacturing, production is 
often either farmed out to other factories or is hiv.ed-off to sub-contractors 
employing individual outworkers. According to another Quality Control 
Manager, "garment quality in the volµme end has decreased with the 
practice of sub-contracting garment manufacture" (Ragtrader,. 1988). It is 
physically impossible to monitor 'production at every sub-contractor's 
establishment, especially considering that many sub-sub-contractors are 
outworkers operating from home. Many manufacturers are ignorant about 
where a garment or a bundle of garments will be at any particular time. 
Suppliers' lists are often no more than a list of phone numbel'S! This 
practice of sub-contracting, or hiving-off, various aspects of production 
has been described by some commentators as a feature of flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS). However, within the clothing sector this 
practice is as old as the industry itself (cf. Hutchins, 1908; Bolton, 1975; 
Fry, 1986; Morokvasic, 1987; Hargreaves, 1982; Ellam, 1990). As Probert 
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and Wajcman note, the practice has traditionally represented an "attempt to 
overcome the limitations of inflexible Fordist production systems" 
(Probert & Wajcman, 1988: 438). Many core retailers are now calling for 
greater traceability in order to control variability in the assembly stage. 
According to one: "From 1980 onwards there has been a major swing away 
from in-house manufacturing to outdoor makers. This remoteness of the 
direct manufacturer has caused quality problems for the retailer. We've 
been forced away from quality assurance back to quality control, to 
inspection control." (For a discussion of this swing, see Cummings, 1986; 
Morokvasic, 1987) 
As will be discussed in the next section, most of Australia ' s principal 
manufacturers have attempted to retain a competitive edge and satisfy 
retailers ' quality demands through introducing microelectronic-related 
innovations in design, pre-assembly and the assembly stage. Their scale of 
production has made investment in such equipment feasible. Furthermore, 
the majority of principals interviewed tended to limit the practice of 
subcontracting to a minimum (if they engaged in it at all). Quality concerns 
were often stated as the main reason for its avoidance. On the other hand, 
among the small-to-medium sized fashion companies interviewed, 
subcontracting and the use of outwork was systematic. More and more 
companies in the small batch, high fashion end of the market are divesting 
themselves of in-house manufacturing and concentrating on their strengths, 
such as design and marketing. It is also significant that the principals which 
engaged in the highest proportion of subcontracting were also in this end of 
the market. This practice (combined with the sophisticated use of 
information technology in production planning and distribution) formed 
part of Benetton's strategy for growth in the fashion industry from the late-
1960's onwards (Belussi , 1987). Furthermore, many small-to-medium 
sized manufacturers in the volume end of the market have adopted this 
form of 'numerical flexibility' (shedding the most labour intensive 
component in the production process) in order to remain competitive 
against cheaper overseas labour, while retaining the advantage of their 
proximity to the market. Moreover, in a competitive market dictated by 
'feasts and famines' many manufacturers are forced to deliberately 
overcommit themselves to orders and rely upon sub-contractors and 
outworkers in order to meet the tight schedules imposed upon them by the 
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retailers. Yet, in the long-run, the continuation of sub-contracting militates 
against the process of quality improvement and enhancement. 
The third point in the quality loop involves the delivery of the order to the 
retailer's distribution centre. With the tendency towards centralised, 
computerised distribution centres, retailers are now demanding much 
stricter delivery times. If deliveries are early or, more commonly, late 
large distribution centres cannot cope with the offending order, often 
leading to the cancellation of orders or discounting, even at this late stage. 
Delivery reliability has become a major factor which is added to the 
physical attributes of the garment in determining a manufacturer's 
eligibility as a quality supplier. For this reason retailers have become 
increasingly interested in the production planning mechanisms used by 
their manufacturing suppliers. This will be explored in greater detail in the 
next section. 
Once orders pass through the doors of the distribution centre they undergo 
statistical inspection and are repackaged for the individual retail outlets. At 
this, the fourth, stage in the quality loop random samples are taken in 
selected stores and feedback is recorded through customer complaints. 
However, the ultimate determination of quality depends upon consumer 
preference. For this reason the final link in the quality loop is regarded as 
the computerised sales figures and the final gross profit of the items. Bar-
coding has enabled the retailer to measure the performance of each garment 
stock-keeping unit (SKU) in the store, in each size and colour. This 
information is then fed back to the purchasing department and/or the 
quality control department for the next generation of orders or redesign. 
Thus, while no Australian retailer has gone as far as Marks and Spencer's 
'manufacturer without factories' philosophy the tendency has been for 
retailers, especially the discounters, to become more actively involved in 
quality control and the production of garments. Many manufacturers, 
frustrated by quality control problems and rejected garments, have 
responded by approaching the retailers' quality control laboratories 
seeking advise and assistance in areas such as textile quality and production 
techniques. As on Quality Control Manager noted: "More and more are 
coming to us for assistance. It's frustration. They're sick of being the ham 
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in the sandwich. They are sick of being crucified by -------- (one of the core 
retailers)". 
RETAILING AND QUICK RESPONSE 
While the core discounting retailers have become more actively involved in 
the engineering of garments, the manufacturers themselves have not been 
slow to develop their own responses to the changing environment. Many 
divisions within Australia's principal clothing companies do not deal with 
discounters, targetting their products at the more up-market department 
stores and smaller specialist stores and boutiques. Their own ability to 
respond flexibly to changing conditions is reflected in their willingness to 
adopt new microelectronic-related production processes and, in some cases, 
new managerial systems, such as TIT, V AM and TQM. 
There are numerous myths which need dispelling about the industry, 
especially among the principals (the top ten of whom account for some 30% 
of production). As anyone who has taken the time to walk through their 
production plants quickly discovers, their operations do not conform with 
the 'sweatshop' image which has traditionally characterised the industry. 
While sweatshops, sub-contracting and outwork still plague the industry 
(especially among small-to-medium companies and women's fashion) and 
will continue to do so because of the various structural and economic 
reasons alluded to above, the majority of principals operate facilities which 
can justifiably be labelled world-class. As noted in the previous section, 
most have invested heavily throughout the 1980 's in 'greenfield' sites, have 
adopted the latest automated machinery from overseas (and in many cases 
patented unique adaptations to suit their requirements) and with it also have 
adopted the more flexible manufacturing and managerial systems which 
reflect the increasing speed of fashion change and consumer demand. In 
addition, the overwhelming majority of principals operate closed union 
shops and have limited the practice of systematic sub-contracting, 
preferring in-house production. 
The use of computer-assisted design (CAD) is now prevalent among the 
principals, who have invested in systems such as Gerber and Lectra graphic 
stations, pattern scanners, graders, plotters and markers. In the pre-
assembly stage most have robotic spreaders and pattern cutters (either of 
25 
the laser or waterjet variety). In the assembly stage, tracking systems (such 
as the Eton 2002) are being introduced in an attempt to reduce material 
handling times. Thus, in terms of physical plant Australia's major clothing 
manufacturers are as technologically efficient as the limits of innovation 
allow. 
The retailers acknowledge this. The problems, as they see it, lie elsewhere. 
When asked whether their manufacturing suppliers required technological 
upgrading, retailing Quality Control Managers often respond in the same 
way: 
In terms of technology they are up-to-date. The problem is the need for management training. At one end you've got retailers with 
sophisticated QC systems. At the other end you've got fabric 
converters who are technologically competent. In the middle there are 
the apparel manufacturers who are quite primitive, with a few 
exceptions. The problem is the technology of management. This is 
especially the case with small-to-medium suppliers. 
Another Quality Control Manager argued: 
Machinery is not the problem. Don't underestimate the up-to-
datedness of Australian machinery! They've got it all and more! It's a 
management problem. 
While a number of principals have introduced new managerial strategies, 
such as JIT, TQM and VAM, few have embraced these methods in their 
totality. The Yakka plant in Shepparton is often considered a model plant in 
JIT. However, it is apparent that most establishments have merely "picked 
the eyes out of JIT" (to quote one Production Manager), adopting some 
elements while ignoring others, such as work organisation. For example, 
the shopfloor is still dominated by the traditional progressive bundling 
system, rather than JITlines or the modular system (Windsor, 1989). 
Within the context of the post-Fordist debate, what was less apparent than 
the investment in MRI is work reorganisation, or evidence of a process of 
multiskilling. MRI and Taylorist work practices (in the form of the bundle 
system and piece rates) usually operate in 'peaceful coexistence' with each 
other, suggesting that neo-Fordism rather than post-Fordism is the norm in 
the industry. It remains to be seen whether this simply reflects the 
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preliminary stage of the bi-partisan Consultative Committees set up by 
CATU and the employers. However, there was little evidence of the 
emergence of a post-Fordist consciousness among the principals inter-
viewed. Again, as noted in the previous section, small-to-medium sized 
· fashion companies are also responding 'flexibly' to the changing market. 
However, the numerical flexibility adopted hardly warrants the optimism 
of post-Fordism. 
JIT is usually referred to in the literature as a managerial strategy affecting 
the flow of production within the manufacturing sector. However, as most 
commentators note, its implications flow through the entire chain of 
production and its ultimate success depends upon a high degree of planning 
and scheduling among firms in the production chain. As the strategy uses a 
'pull' system, a flexible response from manufacturers to customer demand, 
more attention needs to be placed in the literature upon the role that 
retailers and distributors perform, for these are the firms which directly 
interface with the final consumer. The closed quality loop outlined above 
highlights the important role which retailers perform, or can potentially 
perform, in effectively pulling through the right products in the right 
quantity at the right time. 'lbe benefits of JIT and FMS are most effectively 
achieved through tighter coordination between producers and clients, or 
end-users. All too often the potential benefits of these processes are lost 
through being "inserted like an 'island' into an ocean of ... chaos" (Eber 
quoting Brown, 1985: 136). The clothing industry is an excellent example 
of how the changes which are taking place in production affect the relations 
between retailers, manufacturers and their suppliers. As in the case of 
quality control , retailers are at the forefront of the adoption of more 
flexible manufacturing responses in the industry. 
As retailers have become increasingly concerned about speeding up their 
stock turnaround and reducing lead-times, inventory and delivery times, 
they have also become more concerned about their manufacturing 
suppliers' quality loop. In other words, the success of quicker turnaround 
times within the retail sector relies to a large degree upon the 
implementation of flexible manufacturing strategies, such as JIT, within the 
manufacturing sector. 
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While still at an exploratory stage, core Australian retailers are beginning 
to take steps which will force a quicker delivery response from 
manufacturers and their suppliers. While the retail sector has been gearing 
up for some time for this move, through installing computerised stock re-
ordering, Electronic Data Interchanges (EDI) and bar-coding, at least one 
core firm is preparing for a qualitative leap in this form of partnership 
development with their manufacturing suppliers. The first pilot project 
between a core retailer and a principal manufacturing supplier will be 
conducted this year. This retail-led version of the JIT system is appro-
priately named Quick Response (QR). Within the next few years the core 
retailer involved will be demanding Quick Response from all its suppliers, 
at the pain of substantial discounts for non-conformity. 
Quick Response originated in the United States (although it is an adaptation 
of JIT). Since 1984 the clothing management consultancy firm Kurt Salmon 
Associates (KSA) has been involved in over 100 Quick Response pilot 
studies, each showing considerable benefits on returns (see KSA, l 989a, 
l 989b. See also US Office of Technology Assessment, 1987). It is defined 
as "a partnership strategy for retailers, manufacturers and mills to achieve 
faster movement of the right information and products through the 
merchandising and production pipeline" (KSA, 1989a) The partnership 
component of the program requires suppliers to maintain balanced 
inventories and an ability to respond and ship stock item orders within 48 
hours of receipt. The pivotal role of retailers is fundamental to the success 
of QR. According to KSA, in order to capitalise on the potential of the 
program "retail top management must lead. Retailers must define the 
operating criteria that define how a Quick Response program must work. 
Retailers must also measure results and reward both buyers and vendors for 
achievement" (KSA, 1989b). 
This consumer-driven, or 'pull', strategy will require substantial invest-
ment from manufacturers in three main areas. The first is in bar-coding, 
Point Of Sale (POS), and EDI equipment for product marking, computer-
to-computer communications between firms and shipping container 
marking. Second, CAD equipment will be needed for shortening lead times 
in design, sampling and pattern making. Third, firms will have to introduce 
production planning systems such as JIT, V AM and TQM for flexible 
responses in reducing batch sizes and production lead times. Thus, while 
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JIT has been justified in its own right, due to reduced inventory costs, 
manufacturing flexibility, space savings, quality con~ol al\d employee 
participation, its extension through QR into the retailing ~tor is expected 
to fu~er increase returns through closer cooperation between retailers 
· and manufacturers in production scheduling. 
Thus, QR is a retailer-driven version of JIT, or, as one retailer defined it, 
"pulling from the customer interface back to the needlepoint". It is likely to 
further encourage manufacturers to invest in computer-related stock-
keeping, sales and ordering equipment, CAD equipment and flexible 
manufacturing systems. The core Australian retailers will be in a strong 
position to enforce these changes in relationships and practices throughout 
the production chain due to their dominance within the retail sector. 
Manufacturers have few, if any, alternative sources of demand. The core 
retailers are likely to use both carrots and sticks in their effort to ensure its 
implementation. A combination of the 'three p's' used by Latin American 
dictators and caudillos to alter behaviour and ensure compliance will be 
employed by the core retailers over the next few years to enforce QR. 
There will be plata (money) for those who fall into line, • ough secure 
orders and closer cooperation with the giants; there will be palos (sticks) 
for the hesitant in the form of discounting of orders through the costs· of not 
being linked into the retailers' sophisticated ordering system; and there will 
be plomos (bullets in the head) for those unable to accomodate to the 
changes. As one Quality Control Manager warned: "EDI will be fully 
operational in three years. We will introduce it. No two ways! Suppliers 
will have to accomodate to it."3 
3 The adoption of QR by core retailers to enhance profitability expands beyond the 
clothing sector and will affect other industrial chains. The following note in Business 
Review Weekly illustrates the expected transformations within the food processing 
industry. 
"Coles Myer managing director Brian Quinn made it very clear to food retailers at 
the Foodweek convention last week that he expects large profit increases for the 
company as a result of what the grQUp calls its quick-response technology. The 
quick-response technique will substantially reduce the time between the sale of food 
and other retail items at the checkout and the processing of the purchase order. It 
will integrate the factory production process and the reuil operation. The benefits of 
this for the retailer and the manufacturer will be substantial. but the manufacturer 
and the retailer have yet to decide how the bonanza should be divided. Quinn 
clearly believes most of the additional profit should go to the retailer, and he is in a 
position to inttoducc disttibution on that basis. 
"It was apparent from discussions later that some of the food manufacturers at the 
convcotion were not fully aware of the significance of what Brian Quinn was telling 
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Many principal manufacturers are introducing the associated technology 
and techniques on their own initiative, recognising the competitive 
advantage they provide in their own right. For example, the Gaza! 
Corporation has recently upgraded •its information systems. In its 1989 
Annual Report Joe Gaza! wrote that "while further improving our own 
administrative procedures, [the new information systems] will also provide 
assistance to the electronic data interchange systems now being operated by 
large customers in their own sales and reordering controls" (Gazal 
Corporation, 1989). However, small-to-medium sized firms, ·already 
constrained by a tight capital market, will find it far more difficult to 
repond to the challenge of the retailers and also the TCF Plan. The only 
options available to such firms may be the opening of their own retail 
outlets (to guarantee a limited market), the discovery of a comfortable 
niche or a move up-market, concentrate upon corporate apparel, or an 
attempt to reduce labour costs through either moving off-shore or 
expanding the use of sub-contracting and outwork. Through a combination 
of plata and palos the principals will be more than likely to survive the 
process of industry restructuring. However, for a large number of small-
to-medium firms, el plomo may be the only answer. The argument 
presented here supports the prediction made by N. Alan Hunter in 1986 
that: 
The driving force for increased use of technology by the manufacturer 
will probably come from retailers .... The retailer who recognises the 
opportunities QR offers can be expected to · promote the concept forcefully with his suppliers as he, in effect , passes many of his 
inventory problems to his suppliers. (Hunter, 1986) 
In turn, this forces a more flexible response from manufacturers in order 
to control inventory. 
Quick Response, it must be stressed, is still in its pilot stage in Australia. 
However, the core retailers have geared themselves towards its imple-
mentation' and their manufacturing suppliers will have to follow suit. Some 
principals, as mentioned above, ·are already preparing for the change. For 
the hesitant, the knowledge that future orders may depend upon their 
them. Those who do not adapt to quick-response, better known as a form of EDI (electronic data interchange) will almost certainly fall by the wayside." (BRW, 
1990b) 
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-accommodation to the strategy will certainly provide an incentive to adopt 
the technological and managerial changes associated with it. What remains 
to be seen is the form this response will ultimately take. As Campbell has 
pointed out, the strength of the post-Fordist argument lies in its recognition 
that important changes are occurring in the production process (Campbell, 
1990). However, the evidence presented here suggests that the flexible 
responses open to manufacturers are diverse, and that while changes are 
clearly emerging in clothing manufacturing practices at all levels in the 
market evidence of post-Fordist work reoganisation altering the 
relationship between capital and labour are far from being realised. On the 
contrary, a danger exists that the existing segmentation of the labour force 
into core workers and outworkers will become more structurally distinct as 
different firms adopt 'appropriate' forms of flexibility . 
However, within the context of this paper, the point to emphasize is that 
quick response and quality control demonstrate the importance of 
understanding the role performed by core retailers when considering the 
factors driving technological and managerial changes within the clothing 
industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Using the example of the Australian clothing industry, this paper has 
questioned the parameters most commentators adopt when examining 
industrial restructuring and the variables affecting technological and 
organisational change. Economists and political economists all too often 
concentrate their attention upon the so-called 'productive' sector, or the 
manufacturing sector proper in devising industry policy. The evidence 
presented here suggests that a broader conception of an industry chain is 
more helpful for explaining the variables promoting or hindering 
technological and organisational change. The study of the Australian 
clothing industry demonstrates the usefulness of lengthening conceptions of 
an industry chain to include retailers as a core element, rather than simply 
an end point or a passive recipient. Retailers in a mass consumption 
industry such as the clothing industry are a key link in the 'pull' system 
from the consumer through to the manufacturer and their suppliers. One 
important policy implication deriving from this is that industry analysts 
need to focus more upon the interaction between producers and users. In 
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other words, the development of a national innovation system must take 
into consideration the process of "learning by producing, learning by using 
and learning by the interaction of producers and users" (Anderson & 
Lundvall, 1988; Dodgson [ed], 1989). 
The Australian clothing industry illustrates this and examples of the effect 
of core retailers upon manufacturers have been described. Firstly, the trend 
towards oligopoly within the retailing sector has led to greater manu-
facturing dependency upon a small core of clients. Secondly, the 
segmentation of the retail market into discount and department stores has 
helped promote a diversification of product ranges. Thirdly, the 
discounters have performed a catalytic role in heightening the awareness of 
quality control among manufacturers. Fourthly, in the last section the 
prediction was made that the core retailers will be a driving force behind 
the wider adoption of new managerial techniques, such as JIT, due to the 
emergence of Quick Response systems. The core retailers have 
progressively encroached upon terrain traditionally considered the 
manufacturers' sphere of responsibility, to the extent that modem core 
retailing is as much about production as it is about selling. Shopkeeping is 
only one function of the core retailer. In addition, the adoption of QR by 
retailers is forcing manufacturers to broaden their own scope of activities, 
resulting in a cross-fertilisation of traditional functions between retailers 
and manufacturers _, It is often forgotten that the role of retailing in JIT 
practices has a long history. It was back in the immediate post-war years 
that Kiichiro Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno first received their inspiration for 
the Toyota production system after witnessing the stock replenishment 
methods used by United States ' supermarkets (Sayer, 1985; Sainsbury, 
1990). 
As economists have pointed out, the TCF Plan will open the Australian 
market to stiffer import competition. For manufacturers, this pressure will 
make the introduction of flexible manufacturing systems more and more 
imperative and more justifiable in their own right. However, the more 
immediate pressure is closer to home. As one Quality Control Manager 
warned: "Only those who can meet retailers' standards will survive." 
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